A solution to the preferred basis problem of Everett's relative state formalism is presented. The solution does not rely on detailed properties of the observer, apart from the necessity of having at least one distinct state for each possible measurement result, and an initial state. It is argued that our concept that one entity is distinct from another arises from an approximation that the Hilbert space is factorisable in a manner compatible with the Hamiltonian.
Introduction
The problem of determining the relationship between quantum mechanical amplitudes and the results of experiments has lead to a number of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Each has at least one unsatisfying feature, and even today there is no consensus among physicists about which interpretation is best.
Of particular note are the standard, or Copenhagen interpretation, and Everett's relative state, or many-worlds interpretation [1] [2] . In the former, the act of measurement causes the quantum system, in the state |Ψ , to undergo state-reduction, a nonunitary process which leaves the system in an eigenstate, |O i , of the observable, O, associated to the measurement. The probability of realising each eigenstate is given by the square of the magnitude of the amplitude O i |Ψ .
This interpretation has a number of unpleasant characteristics, one of which is the introduction of probabilistic, and hence nondeterministic, events into supposedly fundamental physics. Another is the ambiguity about what exactly constitutes a measurement and what doesn't. It will also be shown in section 3.2 that the Copenhagen interpretation is not compatible with conservation of angular momentum.
In Everett's relative state, or many-world, interpretation, state reduction does not occur. Instead, the system and measuring device (or observer) are together described by a single quantum state, which evolves unitarily. After a measurement then, we are lead by the superposition principle to the conclusion that the state of the system describes a number of observers superimposed on each other, each seeing a different measurement result. This interpretation accepts, as real, the phenomenon of Schrödinger's cat -that a cat may be alive and dead at the same time; alive in one world and dead in another.
This interpretation is in a sense expensive, since it requires us to invoke an infinitude of universes in order to explain the results of our measurements, while for example, the Copenhagen interpretation does not. If one believes that "reality" is a property to be distributed only sparingly among the objects in our theories, then this interpretation appears distasteful.
The next most serious objection to the Everett interpretation is known as the preferred basis problem. This is described in detail in section 2, and a simple solution is presented.
In section 3.1, the idea of when one subpart of a quantum system can be thought of as separate from another is explored. It is argued that the fact that we can view one entity as separate from another arises from the fact that there is a factorisation of the Hilbert space which is usually compatible with the Hamiltonian. It is shown that our tendency to think of separate "things" as repositories of quantities (e.g. "This object has so much angular momentum") is naïve, and that it can fail even when the objects are noninteracting. Section 3.3 describes the conditions under which quantities which are normally conserved, namely those whose operators commute with the Hamiltonian, may be observed to have their conservation violated. Described in section 3.4 is a device which will convert a beam of spin-up particles into a beam of spin-down particles while experiencing no torque itself, and another device which will cause an object to rotate without any other part of the device experiencing a countering torque. These angular momentum generators are predicted by both the Everett and Copenhagen interpretations, but in the many-worlds interpretation there is an overall angular momentum which is conserved, and in the Copen-hagen interpretation conservation of angular momentum is violated.
The Preferred Basis Problem

The Problem
The preferred basis problem is composed of two distinct but related problems. The first problem is that after a measurement of an observable quantity in a quantum system, the states of the system in which this quantity has a definite value are "singled out" as worlds. The question which arises is why those states should be considered worlds in preference to other states.
For example, during the measurement of the z-component of the spin of a spin-half particle, the basis states |↑ z and |↓ z acquire special status, while |↑ x and |↓ x don't. However, the relative state formalism says nothing about how these states are chosen to be special in preference to others, or even why any states should acquire special status at all. Since all interactions should be described by unitary evolution (and are hence linear), how can |↑ z and |↓ z be singled out by some selection process but |↑ z + |↓ z not be?
The second problem is analogous, but refers to the states of the observer. After the measurement, the observer is now in a superposition of states. If |O 1 describes an observer who measured a quantity and found it to be 1, while |O 2 describes an observer who found that same quantity to be 2, then the state of the observer after the measurement might be
The idea of the Everett interpretation is that the two states |O 1 and |O 2 will evolve independently thereafter, to states |O 1 (t) and |O 2 (t) respectively. The state of the observer at a later time will then be 1 √ 2
(|O 1 (t) + |O 2 (t) ). Here neither the observer O 1 nor the observer O 2 has noticed that they are in a superposition and so these two "worlds" do not interfere.
The preferred basis problem here asks why we should decompose the sum into the worlds |O 1 (t) and |O 2 (t) . The sum
(|O 1 (t) + |O 2 (t) ) is also decomposable in terms of the orthogonal basis
(2 |O 1 (t) + |O 2 (t) ) and
(− |O 1 (t) + 2 |O 2 (t) ). These worlds evolve separately as do |O 1 (t) and |O 2 (t) , so they seem to have an equal right to be considered worlds.
Coupling the state of the observer to the state of the system being observed does not help. Consider an observer in an initial state, |D 0 who measures the x-component of the spin of a spin-half particle whose spin is aligned parallel to the z-axis:
where |a |b ≡ |a ⊗ |b . After the measurement, the observer's state is entangled with the particle's spin state. The Copenhagen interpretation says that state reduction occurs and the final state consists of only one of the terms on the right hand side. The many-worlds interpretation identifies two worlds, one in which the particle is in state |↑ x and the observer in |D ↑ , and a separate world in which the particle is in state |↓ x and the observer in |D ↓ . However, 2.1 can be rewritten as:
and one must ask why this does not describe a world with the particle in state |↑ x + |↓ x and the observer in state |D ↑ + |D ↓ superimposed on a world in which the particle is in state |↑ x − |↓ x and the observer in state |D ↑ − |D ↓ . It is often supposed that the reason that the worlds described above do not arise depends on the internal structure of the observer, so that |D ↑ or |D ↓ are somehow better observer states than |D ↑ + |D ↓ . This is related to the idea of decoherence [3] [4] ; that two superimposed states lose their ability to interfere with each other as the physical worlds they describe become increasingly different from each other.
This answer makes the Everett interpretation less appealing since it requires that information about the physiology of the observer be supplied to the model before meaningful predictions about the results of physical experiments can be made. It will be shown in the next section that no such reference to the internal structure of the observer is necessary.
The Solution
In order to solve the problem, it is necessary to combine the two problems described above and to clarify the distinction between the system being observed, A, and the observer, B.
There is the Hilbert space of the entire system, H, which we choose to factorise, H = H A ⊗ H B , into a part H A , corresponding to the system, and a part H B , corresponding to the observer. This factorisation underlies the notion that A and B are separate entities.
In addition, to have a reasonable model of measurement, we must suppose that long before the measurement, and long afterwards, the system A and the observer B do not interact. That is, there are Hamiltonians H A and H B acting on H A and H B respectively, satisfying
where H is the Hamiltonian of H and |a ∈ H A and |b ∈ H B . Equation 2.3 is only expected to hold if the measurement does not occur in the time interval ∆t. During the measurement, some interaction occurs between the system A and the observer B, but the above equation is a statement that during the interval ∆t, A and B do not interact.
What is important to understand is how the notion that the observer B and the system A are separate entities is reflected in the structure of the Hilbert space and the Hamiltonian. Equation 2.3 tells us that if we prepare the system in state |a and the observer in state |b , then we can, at a time ∆t later, talk about the state of A (it is e −iH A ∆t |a ∈ H A ), or the state of B (it is e −iH B ∆t |b ∈ H B ). The factorisation of the Hilbert space, H = H A ⊗ H B , and the independent evolution, eq. 2.3, are the precise relationships that allow us to identify A and B as distinct entities.
There is, however, an additional part to the psychological notion that A and B are separate entities. This is that the "state of the entire system" can be described by separately specifying the state of A and the state of B. This is not reflected in the structures described above, and is equivalent to saying that the Hilbert space H looks like H A ⊕ H B , which it doesn't.
On the other hand, if eq. 2.3 holds at all times, and the initial state is of the form |a |b , with |a ∈ H A and |b ∈ H B , then the state at any later time will look like the right-hand side of eq. 2.3 and so it will remain true that the state of the entire system can be specified by giving the state of A and the state of B. Noninteracting entities in this sense really do conform to an idea of "separate" entities.
This idea can be made precise by constructing the map a : H A ⊕ H B → H defined by a(|u ⊕ |v ) = |u |v . a is neither injective nor surjective, but the states in the image of a are states of the entire system in which A has a definite state and B has a definite state, and no reference to A is necessary to specify the state of B and no reference to B is necessary to specify the state of A. For us to regard A and B as separate entities, it is necessary that the state |Ψ of the system lie in the image of a.
When the observer and system interact, however, it is not always possible to make this distinction. Consider the interaction
If the right hand side is not in the image of a, then we can no longer view the observer and the system as distinct entities, because it cannot be said what the state of the observer B is without referring to the system A.
We are now in a position to construct a model of measurement in the many-worlds formalism.
The ingredients are as follows.
• A Hilbert Space H, and a Hamiltonian H.
• A factorisation H = H A ⊗ H B which distinguishes between the system, A, and the observer, B.
• A map a :
• An initial state, |Ψ |D 0 ∈ image(a).
• Two Hamiltonians, H A and H B , acting on H A and H B respectively.
• Long before the interaction, and long after, the approximation
The last ingredient is to be seen as a restriction on the states and Hamiltonian, not as a statement that the Hamiltonian H changes with time. The initial state is understood to be prepared long before the interaction.
At some time long after the interaction between A and B, the state of the system will be expressible as
with |Ψ i ∈ H A and |D i ∈ H B . i indexes the terms on the right hand side and not states of either H A or H B . 2.5 is tautologous, since every element of H A ⊗ H B can be expressed in this form. Because the observer and system don't interact long after the measurement, |Ψ f inal will evolve to
at later times. If the state |Ψ f inal is in the image of a, then the system and observer can be understood to be distinct objects after the interaction.
We can now begin to define measurement in terms of these interactions. First, we say that the observer B in state |D x has detected that the state of the system before the interaction was |Ψ x if ∃ |Ψ y ∈ H A such that
but for any |Ψ z , |Ψ w ∈ H A , such that |Ψ w = β |Ψ x for any β ∈ C,
where |a → t |b means e −iHt |a = |b , and |a t |b means e −iHt |a = |b . This simply says that |D x describes an observer who has detected the state |Ψ x if the state |Ψ x and no other will cause the observer to go from state |D 0 to |D x . Now say that the observer detects the state |Ψ x without destroying information in the system if
is a detection and
This says that it should be possible to reconstruct the state of the system before measurement by knowing the state of the system after measurement and the initial state of the observer. This is a weaker condition than the corresponding one in the Copenhagen interpretation, which is that a measurement should not change a state if the result of the measurement is determined exactly by the state before the measurement occurs.
It is immediately apparent that the largest set of initial states of the system that can be distinguished by an observer without destroying information in the system is in fact a complete basis. The reason is that the time evolution is linear, and so if
represent processes in which the observer detects the distinct states |Ψ x and |Ψ z , then
The right hand side of equation 2.11 is not in the image of a. This can be seen from the fact that |D x and |D z must be linearly independent, and |Ψ y and |Ψ w must also be linearly independent (otherwise 2.9 & 2.10 could not describe detections which do not destroy information as defined above). The fact that the right hand side of equation 2.11 is not in the image of a means that after the interaction the system and observer cannot be considered distinct objects. The state |Ψ x + |Ψ z is not detectable.
An interaction in which the maximum number of initial states of the system can be distinguished, and which does not destroy information, is then seen to choose a basis of the space H A . We can call such interactions measurements 1 . Whether an interaction is a measurement depends on the Hamiltonian, H, and on the initial state of the observer, |D 0 , but not on the initial state of the system A being measured.
Part of the preferred basis problem has now been answered. It is evident why a particular basis of the Hilbert space of the measured system is singled out for special importance by the interaction with the observer. These are the detectable states. Which states are detectable depend on the nature of the interaction with the observer and on the initial state of the observer.
However there is still the question of how to decompose the state of the system/observer after measurement into separate worlds. This question is deeper than the first, and in order to solve it, it is necessary to relate the state of the entire system after the measurement to the state before, considering a "history" similar to, but distinct from, the consistent histories of Gell-mann [3] . Our particular requirement is that the observer before measurement be in the state |D 0 . It is also necessary to require that both before and after the measurement, the observer be separable from the system being observed.
Consider the example given in section 2.1. A measurement is performed which can detect whether a spin-half particle is in the |↑ x or the |↓ x state. These detections can be described by:
where it has been assumed that the measurement does not interfere with the state of the particle (although this assumption need not be made). The particle's spin is initially aligned along the z-axis, and the measurement proceeds as follows:
Now we can ask which of the states are worlds that the observer might find himself in after the measurement, and one requirement is that both before and after the measurement the world should describe an observer which is a distinct entity from the particle. Clearly, after the measurement, each of the four candidates
describes an observer which is not entangled with the particle. To see what each of these worlds looked like before the measurement, the inverse of the time evolution operator, e iHt can be applied to each state. This yields
It should be evident that e iHt (|↑ x |D ↓ + |↓ x |D ↑ ) cannot be expressed in the form |Ψ |D 0 because 2.12 & 2.13 imply that e −iHt |Ψ |D 0 must be a linear combination of |↑ x |D ↑ and |↓ x |D ↓ .
This means that the states (|↑ x + |↓ x )(|D ↑ + |D ↓ ) and (|↑ x − |↓ x )(|D ↑ − |D ↓ ) cannot arise from any initial state in which the observer is in the state |D 0 . On the other hand, the states |↑ x |D ↑ and |↓ x |D ↓ do indeed correspond to worlds where the observer was in state |D 0 before the interaction.
This distinction deserves more motivation, because one would not expect special status to be granted or withheld from a state |Ψ based on its past, e iHt |Ψ . It could be argued that after the measurement, the state of the system is given by 2.2 and which parts correspond to worlds should be determined either by criteria definable at that instant of time, or by the future evolution of the state. Why should the "reality" granted to the observer in |↑ x |D ↑ be denied to the observer in (|↑ x + |↓ x )(|D ↑ + |D ↓ )?
The essential point is not that we are allocating reality to one observer and not another, but that we are asking the question of what will happen to the observer in state |D 0 when the measurement takes place, and we must do this without a notion that the observer has a single "identity" that will be carried along to a unique future. What we can do is identify the worlds in which there are observers who were in state |D 0 before the measurement. These are the worlds in which the observer might expect to find himself after interacting with the particle.
If one insists on using the notion that reality is being allocated to certain projections of the state vector, then there is no a priori reason not to say that (|↑ x + |↓ x )(|D ↑ + |D ↓ ) is a real world, but that does not mean that the observer beginning in state |D 0 might end up in this world. Reverse-evolving this world might yield a world with an observer in a state such as (|D 0 + |D 1 )/ √ 2, for example, but we require the initial state of the observer to be exactly |D 0 2 .
The observer's history is then seen as the one which must be consistent. We do not demand that each world be consistent with the initial state of the observed system. This may lead the observer to make some rather strange deductions about what the system was doing before the measurement. Consider the example of a photon which is fired at a beam splitter, which, with probability 1 2 , diverts the photon into a detector. If the photon is detected, the observer who "rewinds" his detected photon will deduce that two half-photons must have come together from different directions to combine into his. This is intuitively very improbable, but quantum mechanically definite.
To see that this does not lead to any inconsistency, consider a system and observer in the initial state |Ψ |D 0 , and suppose that after a measurement of the system, the observer finds himself in the world |Ψ ′
x |D x , arising from the detection
After the measurement, the observer must conclude that the initial state was |Ψ x |D 0 rather than |Ψ |D 0 . The amplitude Ψ|Ψ x is both the amplitude for the initial state to have been |Ψ x , and the amplitude for the final state of the entire system to be |Ψ ′
x |D x . This shows that it is "impossible" for an observer to retrodict an "impossible" initial state of the system, if impossible is understood to mean Ψ|Ψ x = 0.
In the example of the observer who deduces that two half-photons came together from different sources to combine into the one he detected, his conclusion is correct in his world, and will never lead to any contradictions. The observer's genuinely best description of his environment's history is what he gets by rewinding the state of his present world.
The final point to observe is that, since the detectable states |Ψ x form a basis of the Hilbert space of the system to be observed, the "worlds" e −iHt |Ψ x |D 0 form a basis, not of the entire Hilbert space H, but of the subspace consisting of vectors of the form e −iHt |Ψ |D 0 , with |Ψ ∈ H A . That is, the worlds are a basis of the subspace of states which might result from the interaction of the observer, in state |D 0 , with the system, in any state. This is, then, a precise solution of the preferred basis problem.
The solution requires clarifying the idea that the observer should be a separate entity from the system being observed, and also emphasising that the problem asks not which worlds are real, but which worlds an observer in a particular initial state might expect to find himself in.
3 Separability and Conservation of Quantities
Distinctness of Entities and Factorisability
Now we turn to the question of what it means to say that one thing is a separate entity from another. If the Hilbert space of a quantum system factorises, H = H A ⊗ H B , and the Hamiltonian H of the entire system is
where I B and I A are identity operators, H int is usually zero or neglibigle, and H A and H B act on H A and H B , respectively, then the approximation that A and B are separate entities is a useful one, in the sense that if the system is prepared in the state |a |b ∈ H A ⊗ H B at time 0, then it will evolve to the state (e −iH A t |a )(e −iH B t |b ) at time t, provided H int is zero during the evolution. H int is zero if the system is in a state |Ψ such that H int |Ψ = 0. In fact, whenever the Hilbert space and Hamiltonian have this structure, unless the subsystems A and B are entangled to begin with, the two systems will behave independently and will be seen to be separate systems. This is the precise quantum mechanical formulation of the idea that one thing is distinct from another, and it underlies our ideas of locality and independence. It allows us to "perturbatively" build up a picture of the world in which there are separate entities that affect each other by interacting.
However, it should be borne in mind that this is an approximation that we make because the Hilbert space and Hamiltonian have this structure. That is, there will be states in H for which H int is not zero. After an interaction between A and B, the two subsystems may become entangled, and the notion of the two as separate systems may no longer be applicable, even though H int may be zero again.
When factorising the Hilbert space as described above, there is a temptation to also assume that the operators that we consider conserved quantities will behave like the Hamiltonian in 3.1. That is, that a conserved quantity, X, will look like
where X int is small. In fact, there is no reason to believe that this is the case. The approximation that A and B are separate entities is useful because H int is usually zero or small, and we will make that approximation whenever that is the case, whether or not 3.2 holds with X int small. It is also worth noting that X int really has nothing to do with any interaction between A and B, while H int does. If H int is zero, then A and B won't interact, whether or not X int is zero.
In the next section it will be shown how this can be used to apparently generate conserved quantities from entanglements.
Violation of Angular Momentum Conservation
Consider once again what happens when a measurement is made of the x-component of the spin of a spin-half particle which is prepared in the |↑ z state:
where |D 0 , |D ↑ , and |D ↓ indicate the states of a detector which has measured nothing, spin up, and spin down, respectively 3 . In the Copenhagen interpretation, the system after measurement has collapsed and the final state is either |↑ x |D ↑ or |↓ x |D ↓ 4 . In the Everett interpretation, the final state is as shown in eq. 3.3.
In either interpretation, though, the final angular momentum of the particle along the zdirection is apparently different to its inital angular momentum. It is natural to assume that the measuring device must absorb or provide whatever conserved quantities are necessary to account for the difference between the state before measurement and the state after measurement. In this case, though, this is not possible.
If it is supposed in the Copenhagen interpretation that the measuring device has absorbed the z-angular momentum of the particle, then one must say that the state |D ↑ of the detector has more angular momentum in the z-direction than does the state |D 0 . But then the process
is seen to generate angular momentum in the z-direction.
It is true that in quantum mechanics it is assumed that measuring devices are much heavier than the systems being measured, and that these kinds of effects are assumed to be negligible. However, these are assumptions. It is a valid question to ask whether a SternGerlach device will experience a torque when used to measure the x-spin of a beam of spin-half particles prepared in the |↑ z state. The combined spin angular momentum of the particles in the beam before it encounters the device may not be negligible, but afterwards each particle has an expectation value of 0 for its z-component of angular momentum.
Intuitively, one would expect that a torque should be produced on the device to account for the difference in the beam before and after measurement. It is not obvious how one might modify the formalism of the Copenhagen interpretation to take into account the finite moment of inertia of the measuring device when measuring a single particle. Before state reduction, the superposition principle applies, and the system must be in a state |Ψ ↑ z = |Ψ ↑ x + |Ψ ↓ x , where |Ψ ↑ x describes what the situation would be if the spinhalf particle had spin up along the x-axis, and |Ψ ↓ x describes the spin-down situation. After state reduction, one of these is excluded and we must be left with either |Ψ ↑ x or |Ψ ↓ x . Without abandoning either state reduction or the superposition principle it is not possible for the state of the detector after measurement to reflect the fact that the particle was in an eigenstate of S z before measurement, or even that the particle did not begin with a definite value of S x .
In particular, the naïve idea that the measuring device randomly chooses either |↑ x or |↓ x , and then expends whatever angular momentum is necessary to bring the particle to that state, is inconsistent with the superposition principle.
In any case, looking at the Everett picture reveals that it is not the state reduction which causes the violation. Let L z D be the operator which represents the angular momentum of the measuring device around the z-axis, while L z p is the corresponding operator for the particle (the Pauli matrix σ 3 /2).
The expectation value of
for the state described by the right hand side of 3.3 is given by:
If we suppose that the detector begins with no angular momentum along the z-axis, then D ↑ | L z D |D ↑ is the average amount of angular momentum along the z-direction that the measuring device absorbs when it detects a particle with spin up along the x-axis. D ↓ | L z D |D ↓ is the amount absorbed when it detects a particle with spin down along the x-axis. It would violate angular momentum conservation in an even stranger way if either of these were nonzero, and in a stranger way still if the sum of these were nonzero.
The conclusion must be that the violation of angular momentum conservation in this picture does not depend on state reduction. It cannot be said that something mysterious happens to balance the angular momentum during wavefunction collapse, because the violation appears even when the collapse does not occur.
It must be acknowledged that any Hamiltonian which produces the interaction 3.3 must not commute with L z as defined by 3.5, which explains how the violation appears in this formalism. The x-axis is chosen as special and this breaks the symmetry of the system. On the other hand, this is not satisfactory because no reference to other possible states of the detector has been made. It may be that the detector has a different initial state for every possible orientation, and indeed this is the case with physical detectors. In that sense, the Hamiltonian does not break the symmetry of the system, and it is the initial state of the detector which chooses the x-axis as special.
Whatever the Hamiltonian is, it evidently does not commute with 3.5. However, this does not mean that the Hamiltonian breaks the spherical symmetry. It means that the symmetry is not correctly described by 3.5.
In order to remedy the situation, it is necessary to revise the idea that the particle and measuring device are separate entities, each acting as an independent reservoir of angular momentum:
In this way, it will be possible to conserve angular momentum overall. There is no reason to assume that L z int should be zero when the particle and device are not interacting. When the two are not interacting, it is H int which is zero, and L z int may adopt any value. The approximation that the particle and detector are separate entities is made because H int is usually zero. The only restriction on L z int is that L z must commute with H in order for angular momentum to be conserved globally.
The meaning of this is that after the interaction, the place where the angular momentum has gone is into the "+" sign in the expression
. This makes immediate sense because if the incoming particle had been in the state |↓ z , then the final state of the system would be
(|↑ x |D ↑ − |↓ x |D ↓ ). In this case, long after the interaction between the particle and the device, L z int is nonzero, and this is seen as a deficit in the amount of angular momentum visible in each "world" of the state vector. In the context of the Copenhagen interpretation, however, the angular momentum of the system is simply not conserved. In either interpretation, the observer will see the total amount of angular momentum in the world change. In the case of the beam of particles prepared in the |↑ z state, the prediction of both interpretations is that the spin angular momentum of the beam will be observed to disappear, with no counteracting torque on the measuring device.
It is worth discussing, as a final point, why the interaction of a spin-half particle with another spin-half particle does not violate angular momentum conservation in the way described above. A particle initially prepared in the |↑ x state must remain in that state if it encounters a second particle in that same state. If it encounters a particle in the |↓ x state, it may flip its spin.
In the language of section 2.2, the final states ↑ 2 x and ↓ 2 x have detected the initial states ↑ 1 x and ↓ 1 x . However, this does not constitute a measurement because they have not detected those states without destroying information in the system. In both cases, the first particle ends up in state ↑ 1
x . Angular momentum is conserved in this interaction. An actual measurement performed using a Stern-Gerlach magnet does not destroy information in the spin system. The polarised beams which emerge from the magnetic field have definite and distinct spin polarisations. 3.3 can be expected to describe the interaction more accurately than 3.9 and 3.10, and it is genuinely predicted that a violation of angular momentum conservation will be observed.
Nonconservation of Quantities
Consider a state vector |Ψ , which is the superposition of two Everett "worlds", |Ψ = |A + |B , and a real quantity, X, which is conserved, [X, H] = 0. The observer in world A will measure (on average) the amount of X to be A| X |A , and the observer in world B will measure B| X |B . The expectation value of X in the state |Ψ is given by:
It is the value of X which is conserved over time, while A| X |A and B| X |B may change over time. The deficit in the amount of X visible to the observer in A or B will be given by the real part of A| X |B .
This must, however, be consistent with the conservation equation, [X, H] = 0. It must also be the case that A and B do not interact, A| H |B = 0, in order for the worlds to evolve independently. These conditions give:
where P is the operator which projects onto the plane spanned by |A and |B , and H AB , X AB refer to P HP and P XP respectively. If the states |A and |B have the same expectation value of energy, A| H |A = B| H |B , and given A| H |B = 0, the action of H restricted to the AB plane should be proportional to the identity, and so equation 3.11 will be satisfied for any value of A| X |B .
The conclusion is that arbitrary amounts of the conserved quantity X can be observed to disappear from the universe because of this effect, provided the worlds whose superposition accounts for the deficit have equal expectation values of energy.
It is evident that energy cannot be generated using this method, since if A| H |B is nonzero then A and B are interacting and cannot be considered separate worlds.
Generating Angular Momentum
According to the predictions of quantum mechanics, in any interpretation, a measuring device used to measure the spin of a particle will experience no torque, even if the expectation value of the particle's angular momentum is different before and after the measurement. It is not difficult to devise ways to exploit this phenomenon and generate "free" angular momentum.
The simplest method, beginning with an unpolarised beam of spin-half particles, would be to split the beam into two polarised beams, using a Stern-Gerlach magnet with the magnetic field gradient aligned along the z-axis. The angular momentum of the particles in one beam can then be "destroyed" by using a second Stern-Gerlach device to measure their spin along the x-axis. The unmeasured beam is then polarised along the z-axis, and if the particles in this beam then encounter and bind to a solid object, the object should absorb the angular momentum of the individual particles, and eventually rotate, although the effect will be small unless the number of particles in the beam is extremely large (∼ 10 30 ).
A slightly more involved method can be used to change a beam of spin-up particles (up along the z-axis, say) into a beam of spin-down particles, without stopping the beam, by making use of the fact that if a spin-half particle does not have spin down along a particular axis, then it must have spin up along that axis.
Consider an incoming beam of particles whose spin is up along the z-axis. Measurement of the spin of each particle along the z-axis would then yield a definite result (up). Such a measurement can be made without interrupting the beam. A Stern-Gerlach magnet with its axis aligned with the z-axis will split the beam into two parts, and a photographic plate or other detector can be used to verify that the "down" beam is empty. Now if the incoming beam has spin aligned up along the z-axis, but the axis of the Stern-Gerlach device is at a small angle, ǫ, to the z-axis (call the orientation of this device the z ′ -axis), then the fraction of the beam which will be found to be spin-down along the z ′ -axis will be ǫ 2 /4. That fraction (1 − ǫ 2 /4) of the beam which is spin-up along the z ′ -axis does not have to be interrupted.
This process can be repeated several times, each time changing the angle of polarisation of the beam by ǫ. The fraction of the beam which is lost each time will be proportional to ǫ 2 , and the number of times this must be done to produce an outgoing beam which is polarised down along the original z-axis is π/ǫ. The fraction of the beam lost by this entire process will then be proportional to ǫ, which can be arbitrarily small.
The collection of these Stern-Gerlach magnets and detectors can be considered as one large device, which takes a beam of particles and flips the spin of each one without experiencing any torque itself. In fact, if the angle ǫ is much smaller than the reciprocal of the number of particles, then the device will not even detect anything while the spins of the particles in the beam rotate.
Conclusions
The preferred basis problem of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is resolved by understanding that the task is not to identify which projections of the state vector should be considered worlds, but to identify which worlds an observer with a given initial state might expect to find himself in after a measurement.
The notion that one thing is a distinct entity from another is an approximation made because of a factorisability of the Hilbert space, H = H A ⊗ H B , along with a Hamiltonian H which only weakly or rarely mixes A and B: H = H A ⊗ I B + I A ⊗ H B + H int . Two objects appear to be separate if they rarely interact, H int ≈ 0. However this does not mean that other conserved quantities, X, must be stored separately in each object. It is possible to exploit this fact and hide conserved quantites in the relative signs of superposed Everett worlds. In the Copenhagen interpretation, this effect is seen as simple violation of conserved quantities during measurement. It is inconsistent to suppose that the measuring device absorbs or supplies the conserved quantity.
In particular, is it really predicted by quantum mechanics that violation of angular momentum conservation will be observed during experiments involving spin measurements. This effect will be small, since the amount of angular momentum lost or gained per particle measured is on the order of . If the effect is measurable but not observed, it may be the first experimental indication of the boundaries of validity of quantum theory. Such a null result might indicate that state reduction occurs as the result of nonlinear evolution. It is also perhaps of note that in the Everett interpretation, the amount of angular momentum producible with this method is limited by the number of states of the observer, while in the Copenhagen interpretation there is no limit.
Appendix: Hermiticity and Orthogonality
In sections 3.2 and 3.3, we treated the operators X and H as Hermitian operators on a Hilbert space, and used the traditional bra-ket notation, with the underlying notion of an inner product. However, if we define the inner product by demanding that the detectable states of section 2.2 be orthogonal (in fact, orthonormal), then we have only defined an inner product on H A , the state space of the observed system. It is then improper to talk of linear operators on the state space of the entire observer-observed system as being Hermitian, or to discuss expectation values of operators like X.
There is a philosophical problem associated to this mathematical one. Measurable quantities, such as X, must by definition be part of the environment which the observer observes. On the other hand, the observer is a part of the world, and should be subject to the same physics as the environment that he observes. The problem of extending the operator X from a Hermitian operator on the state space of the observed world, H A , to a Hermitian operator on the state space of the whole world, H, requires us to circumvent this philosophical problem.
One approach may be to try to extend the inner product and notion of conserved quantity by "keeping track" of what occurs during interactions between the observer and the environment. The interactions are mediated by the Hamiltonian, and this approach would presumably proceed by demanding that the Hamiltonian be Hermitian on the entire state space.
A philosophically and mathematically simpler, though perhaps less satisfying, approach, would be to note that one observer may be part of the environment of another. The first observer will then have characteristics measurable by the second, and the second observer can define orthogonal states of the first. The second observer can then calculate and make her predictions about what worlds the first might find himself in when he makes his spin measurements. She can use Hermitian operators on a Hilbert space to describe conserved observable quantities during the measurements, but before the first observer reports his results to her. Distinguishable reports would by definition correspond to orthogonal states of the first observer, and so the orthogonality assumed in footnote 3 is justified.
